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INTRINSIC IMBALANCE:
THE IMPACT OF INCOME DISPARITY ON
FINANCIAL REGULATION
STEVEN L. SCHWARCZ*
When I was young I thought that money was the most important thing in life; now that
I am old I know that it is.
Oscar Wilde

From an administrative law standpoint, what, if anything, distinguishes
financial regulation from other forms of regulation? In part, the answer is
complexity; financial products and markets are already highly complex and
1
becoming increasingly more so. But this is only a partial answer because other
regulatory spheres, such as environmental and nuclear regulation, can be at
least as complex as financial regulation.
This article argues that what further, and more tellingly, distinguishes
financial regulation from other forms of regulation is the extraordinary income
2
disparity between regulators and industry employees. This income disparity—
coupled with the complexity of financial products and markets—creates an
3
“information asymmetry” between regulators and industry that can lead to
regulatory failure: the inability of regulators to fully understand, and thus to
effectively monitor and regulate, financial innovations that might create
systemic externalities.
Part I of this article demonstrates that there is at least a two-to-one income
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1. Cf. Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 211,
212–13 (2009) (observing that complexity is “the greatest financial-market challenge of the future”).
2. This article focuses on the income disparity, or gap, between individuals with relatively similar
backgrounds in terms of education and experience. It does not focus on the overall distribution of
income, nor does it focus on earning disparities between individuals with different backgrounds.
3. This article uses the term “information asymmetry” broadly, to include an asymmetry in the
processing of information. Economists sometimes use the term “information asymmetry” more
narrowly, confining it to facts; in that more narrow sense, an information asymmetry would exist only if
one party were to have more or better information than another party (regardless of either party’s
ability to process the information).
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disparity between financial industry employees and their regulatory
counterparts. Part II of the article argues that this income disparity makes it
difficult for financial regulatory agencies to hire competitively, thereby creating
an information asymmetry between regulators and industry. Part III examines
the adverse consequences of that information asymmetry to administrativeagency rulemaking, monitoring, and enforcement. Finally, part IV of the article
discusses potential responses to the income disparity (and resulting information
asymmetry).
This article focuses on financial regulation by administrative agencies.
Legislative bodies typically delegate power to administrative agencies to
implement statutory law through agency rulemaking, monitoring, and
enforcement of compliance. The income disparity discussed in this article is a
disparity between the incomes of administrative agency financial regulators and
the incomes of employees in the financial industry being regulated.
To some extent, the income disparity is driven by administrative-agency
budgets. Were a budget its only limit, an agency might have the flexibility to
choose between hiring a smaller number of higher-income employees or a
larger number of lower-income employees. In practice, however, this flexibility
is somewhat limited. Some administrative-agency incomes are subject to per4
person maximum compensation caps. Moreover, an agency’s need for some
minimum number of employees ultimately limits its ability to hire a smaller
5
number of higher-income employees.
I
THE INCOME DISPARITY
It is generally recognized that there is an income disparity between
government regulators and private-sector employees in regulated industries.
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics surveys indicate, for example, that federal
government pay is around twenty-five percent lower than private-sector pay for
6
similar jobs. This is mainly because federal government workers are typically

4. See infra notes 7–8 and accompanying text.
5. See, e.g., infra notes 82–83 and accompanying text (discussing the large number of regulatory
personnel needed to pursue enforcement actions); cf. William Alden, For 2 Wall Street Regulators,
More Belt-Tightening, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 2014, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/01/14/for-2-wallstreet-regulators-more-belt-tightening/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0
(reporting
that
under
Congress’s restricted new budget proposal, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission “would
probably not reach [its] goal” of hiring “an additional 676 workers in 2014”).
6. Gregory B. Lewis & Sue A. Frank, Who Wants to Work for the Government?, 62 PUB. ADMIN.
REV. 395, 396 (2002) (discussing the income disparity generally between the public and private sector
for similar jobs). Lewis and Frank also state that “economists typically find that similar workers (those
of the same race and sex with the same levels of education and experience) earn much more in the
federal than in the private sector . . . .” Id. If those economists’ findings are accurate, the impact of the
income disparity between the public and the private sector may be even more pronounced for financial
jobs than for nonfinancial jobs because federal government pay would be more comparable to privatesector pay for similar jobs generally, whereas it would still be more than fifty percent lower than
private-sector pay for similar financial jobs. Cf. infra note 33 and accompanying text (making a
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paid in accordance with the general schedule or the executive schedule as
7
overseen by the U.S. Office of Personnel Management. For each pay grade,
8
there is a maximum compensation cap. Thus, the “public sector is not usually
able to compete with the salaries offered by private employers, especially those
9
of highly educated personnel and managers.”
A much larger income disparity exists, however, between financial
regulators and private-sector employees of the financial industry. This disparity
can be demonstrated by comparing the incomes of representative financial
industry workers and government regulators. The U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics reports, for example, that entry-level investment bankers, who are
categorized as financial analysts, had a median annual salary of $90,560 in 2012
10
and a mean annual salary of $111,650. Higher-level investment bankers, who
are categorized as financial managers, earned an average annual salary of
11
$160,900. These figures represent salaries but do not account for options and
bonuses, which are a prevalent form of additional compensation in the financial
12
13
industry. Wall Street bonuses averaged $138,970 in 2010. Even entry-level
investment bankers, with only bachelor’s degrees, earned an average bonus of
14
$55,000 in 2013.

comparison based on the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics survey data).
7. Federal Salary Act of 1967, 5 U.S.C. § 5332 (2006) (“The General Schedule is a schedule of
annual rates of basic pay, consisting of 15 grades, designated ‘GS-1’ through ‘GS-15’, consecutively,
with 10 rates of pay for each such grade.”); see also OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MGMT, SALARY TABLE
2013-GS
(2013),
available
at
http://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/pay-leave/salarieswages/2013/general-schedule/gs.pdf.
8. 5 U.S.C. § 5333 (2006).
New appointments shall be made at the minimum rate of the appropriate grade. However, . . .
[under certain enumerated circumstances] the head of an agency may appoint, with the
approval of the Office in each specific case, an individual to a position at such a rate above the
minimum rate of the appropriate grade . . . .
Id.
9. KIRSI ÄIJÄLÄ, THE ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV. PUB. MGMT. SERV., PUBLIC
SECTOR—AN EMPLOYER OF CHOICE? REPORT ON THE COMPETITIVE EMPLOYER PROJECT 29
(2001).
10. Securities, Commodity Contracts, and Other Financial Investments and Related Activities:
NAICS
523,
BUREAU
OF
LABOR
STATISTICS,
U.S.
DEP’T
OF
LABOR,
http://www.bls.gov/iag/tgs/iag523.htm (last visited Sep. 26, 2014).
11. May 2012 National Industry-Specific Occupational Employment and Wage Estimates NAICS
523900 – Other Financial Investment Activities, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF
LABOR, http://www.bls.gov/oes/current/naics4_523900.htm (last visited Sep. 26, 2014).
12. See OFFICE OF THE STATE COMPTROLLER, NEW YORK SECURITIES INDUSTRY BONUS POOL
(2013), available at http://www.osc.state.ny.us/press/releases/feb13/avgbonus.pdf (listing the average
bonuses given to Wall Street employees annually).
13. Id.
14. See Brian DeChesare, 2013 Investment Banking Bonuses: Is “Flat” Better Than Nonexistent?,
MERGERS & INQUISITIONS, http://www.mergersandinquisitions.com/2013-investment-bankingbonuses/. For the bonuses of non-top-tier firms, around $10,000 needs to be subtracted. Id.; cf.
http://www.careers-inInvestment
Banking:
Salaries,
CAREERS-IN-BUSINESS.COM,
finance.com/ibsal.htm (last visited Sep. 24, 2014) (reporting that bonuses for first-year private-sector
financial analysts ranged between $20,000 and $40,000 in 2013).
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Contrast these figures with public-sector salary data for reasonably
15
comparable jobs. Although the maximum compensation cap does not apply to
16
many federal financial regulatory agencies, those agencies are still limited by
17
budgetary constraints. As a result, entry-level financial employees of the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) are paid only between $39,094 and
18
$58,904 in base salary. Entry-level employees at federal banking regulatory
19
agencies are paid comparable salaries. This contrasts with the twice-as-high
20
salaries of entry-level private-sector financial analysts.
The compensation differential between more-senior public-sector jobs and
private-sector financial jobs might appear to be smaller: the FDIC, for example,
21
might pay a senior financial analyst an initial salary of up to $153,000,
compared to the $160,900 average salary paid to private-sector financial
22
managers. However, that differential is almost certainly larger for two reasons:
23
first, the quoted FDIC salary is a maximum and not an average; and second, in
24
addition to salary, huge bonuses are prevalent in the financial industry,

15. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
16. Some federal financial regulatory agencies are statutorily permitted to set their own pay
schedule and therefore are able to offer salaries that exceed the limits of the general schedule. Thus,
the Federal Reserve System, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), Office of Thrift
Supervision, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), National Credit Union Administration,
and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) are exempt from those limits, although each such
agency is still subject to its own internal limits. See, e.g., 2013 FDIC Base Salary Structures, FED.
DEPOSIT INS. CORP., http://www.fdic.gov/about/jobs/2013cgcmcxem.pdf (last visited Sep. 24, 2014)
(listing FDIC pay scale); 2014 FR Salary Structures, FED. RESERVE BOARD,
http://www.federalreserve.gov/careers/salary.htm (last visited Sep. 24, 2014) (listing Federal Reserve
Board pay scale); Salaries, OFFICE OF COMPTROLLER OF CURRENCY, http://www.occ.gov/about/whowe-are/careers/salaries.html (last visited Sep. 24, 2014) (listing OCC pay scale); 5 U.S.C. § 4802
(exempting the SEC from compensation limits). For the SEC, no pay plan was publicly available.
17. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
18. See SEC Pay Structure: Base Pay Ranges, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N,
http://www.sec.gov/jobs/sec-pay.shtml (last visited Jan. 5, 2015) [hereinafter SEC Pay Structure] (listing
the minimum and maximum for SK-7 level employees (effective Jan. 26, 2014)). SK-7 level employees
include entry-level examiners with a bachelor’s degree in finance or business. Opportunities for
Examiners with the SEC, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/jobs/examiners.htm (last
visited Jan. 5, 2015) [hereinafter Opportunities for Examiners with the SEC]. These figures do not
account for a supplementary geographical pay that can be higher, including 30.74% higher for New
York City. See SEC Pay Structure, supra note 18.
19. See Opportunities for Examiners with the SEC, supra note 18.
20. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
21. See, e.g., Senior Financial Analyst, U.S. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT,
https://www.usajobs.gov/JobSearch/Search/GetResults?OrganizationID=FD00&ApplicantEligibility=
All (last visited Dec. 8, 2014) [hereinafter Senior Financial Analyst] (indicating the high end of the base
salary range offered for this type of FDIC position).
22. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. I could not corroborate, however, the extent to
which public-sector senior policy analysts and private-sector financial managers are perfectly
comparable jobs.
23. The low end of the base salary range offered for that type of senior FDIC position, for
example, is in the $93,000 range. See Senior Financial Analyst, supra note 21.
24. See supra notes 12–13 and accompanying text.
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whereas bonuses are rare and smaller in size within the public sector. Thus, the
real comparison of the senior public-sector salary may be to a senior private26
27
sector compensation of $299,870. If that comparison is accurate, it again
represents at least a twice-as-high compensation of the private sector over the
public sector for financial jobs.
This approximately two-to-one private-sector compensation advantage is
mirrored in all of the available data (except at the top compensation levels,
28
where the private sector’s compensation advantage spirals even higher ). For
example, private-sector financial examiners who “ensure compliance with laws
and regulations governing financial and securities institutions and financial and
29
real estate transactions” earn a mean annual salary of $86,980, whereas publicsector financial examiners performing the same type of work earn only $50,000
30
annually. Moreover, the two-to-one advantage shown by the data is probably
conservative because the data reflect the recent post–financial crisis recession
31
period, whereas private-sector compensation for financial jobs increases even

25. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., PUBLIC MANAGEMENT OCCASIONAL PAPERS
NO. 15: PERFORMANCE PAY SCHEMES FOR PUBLIC SECTOR MANAGERS: AN EVALUATION OF THE
IMPACTS (1997). Although no law limits the number of size of bonuses that can be paid to federal
agency workers, the appropriateness of bonuses are judged by agency heads and overseen by Congress.
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, EXECUTIVE BONUSES: INFORMATION ON FDIC’S AND RTC’S
EXECUTIVE BONUS PROGRAMS 2 (1993), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/220/218721.pdf.
Indeed, another source suggests that a representative bonus for an FDIC senior financial analyst may
be in the $5,000 range. See FDIC Senior Financial Analyst Salary, GLASSDOOR.COM,
http://www.glassdoor.com/Salary/FDIC-Senior-Financial-Analyst-Salaries-E18376_D_KO5,29.htm (last
visited Dec. 8, 2014); see generally OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N,
2008 AUDIT OF SENSITIVE PAYMENTS (2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/oig/reportspubs/
final_sensitive_payments_report.pdf (auditing 2008 compensation, including bonuses, of high level SEC
staff).
26. This figure is the sum of the $160,900 average salary paid to private-sector financial managers,
see supra note 22 and accompanying text, and the $138,970 average private-sector bonus, see supra note
13 and accompanying text.
27. Anecdotal evidence collected by the U.S. General Accounting Office suggests that comparison
is generally correct, at least for the compensation differential between public-sector SEC jobs and
private-sector equivalent jobs. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION: HUMAN CAPITAL CHALLENGES REQUIRE MANAGEMENT ATTENTION 2, 6 (2001),
available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/240/232683.pdf) (reporting that “SEC officials, who are aware of
the significance of this [compensation differential] issue, told us that the SEC staff often make fifty
percent less than employees in comparable positions in the private sector . . . .”).
28. For example, the Chairman of the Federal Reserve receives an annual salary of $201,700, see
FAQ on Selection of Federal Reserve Board Members, FED. RESERVE BOARD (Jan. 31, 2014),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/faqs/about_12591.htm, whereas the CEO of Bank of America earned an
annual salary of $1.5 million and, with the addition of options and bonuses, received $24.8 million in
total compensation, see Big Bank Execs: What They Take Home, CNN.COM,
http://money.cnn.com/news/specials/storysupplement/ceopay/ (last visited Sep. 24, 2014) (reporting on
2007 compensation).
29. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL EMPLOYMENT AND
WAGES, MAY 2013, available at http://www.bls.gov/oes/current/oes132061.htm.
30. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, ENTRY-LEVEL BANK EXAMINERS,
available at http://www.occ.gov/about/who-we-are/careers/entry-level-bank-examiner.html.
31. All of this article’s private-sector financial-job compensation data come from the period 2010–
2013. See supra notes 10, 11, 13, 14, & 29 and accompanying text.
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32

more during financial booms.
Thus, although federal government pay is around twenty-five percent lower
33
than private-sector pay for similar jobs generally, it appears to be more than
fifty percent lower than private-sector pay for similar financial jobs.
II
THE RESULTING INFORMATION ASYMMETRY
This huge income disparity, in which financial regulators earn only (and
perhaps less than) half the income of members of the financial industry, makes
it difficult for regulatory agencies to hire competitively compared to industry.
As explained below, that, in turn, creates an information asymmetry between
the two groups.
A. The Income Disparity Makes it Difficult for Regulatory Agencies To Hire
Because of the income disparity, regulatory agencies cannot hire
34
competitively compared to the financial industry. Consider, for example, the
SEC’s staffing crisis, which is “primarily due to [an] inability to compensate
35
[SEC] employees adequately.” With “few exceptions, departing [SEC]
employees overwhelmingly cite[d] the higher salaries offered by private sector
36
firms as their primary reason for resigning.” Salary was also cited as the major
37
reason for prospective employees declining SEC employment offers. Other
studies have confirmed this government-salary problem, finding that “too many
of the best recruits are rethinking their commitment, either because they are fed
up with the constraints of outmoded personnel systems and unmet expectation
for advancement or simply lured away by the substantial difference between
38
public and private sector salaries in many areas.”
Other things being equal, people choosing between employment offers will

32. Philip Bond & Vincent Glode, The Labor Market for Bankers and Regulators 27 REV. FIN.
STUD. 2539, 2557–60, 2567–68 (2014) (finding that during financial booms, financial firms “poach” the
best regulatory workers by offering even greater compensation).
33. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. The above comparison may even understate the
relative impact of the income disparity for financial jobs. See supra note 6.
34. See, e.g., Camelia M. Kuhnen, Searching for Jobs: Evidence from MBA Graduates 25–27
(Working Paper, March 2011), available at http://public.kenan-flagler.unc.edu/faculty/kuhnenc/
RESEARCH/Kuhnen_SearchingForJobs_030411.pdf (noting that, in general, candidates with higher
ability self-select into higher paying jobs).
35. Pay Parity Implementation Plan and Report, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, (Mar. 6, 2002),
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/payparity.htm (“Public Service always entails an element of sacrifice
on the part of government employees.”).
36. Id.; accord U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 27, at 6 (“By an overwhelming
majority, current and former SEC attorneys, accountants and examiners we surveyed cited
compensation as their primary reason for leaving the SEC.”).
37. U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 35.
38. THE NAT’L COMM’N ON THE PUB. SERV., URGENT BUSINESS FOR AMERICA: REVITALIZING
THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 8 (2003) (emphasis added).
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select the offer paying twice as much as alternatives. Next, examine whether,
in choosing between employment by a public-sector regulator and a privatesector firm, other things are truly equal.
There are two relevant frameworks by which to assess human economic
decisionmaking in choosing employment. The more general framework is
40
rational choice theory (RCT), which assumes that rational people will pursue
41
the greatest net benefits. Although individuals will therefore seek, other things
42
(again) being equal, a higher-paying job over a lower-paying job, other things
will not necessarily be equal when choosing between public-sector and privatesector employment. RCT studies show that that choice can involve differences
43
44
45
in workplace values, degrees of risk aversion, reward preferences, and
46
personality types. However, the extent to which these differences outweigh
47
income differentials is inconclusive.
Public sector motivation (PSM)—“an individual’s predisposition to respond
to motives grounded primarily or uniquely in public institutions and
48
organizations” —is the other relevant framework by which to assess human
economic decisionmaking in choosing between public-sector and private-sector
jobs. PSM posits that some individuals will choose to earn less money in the
39. See generally John W. Boudreau, Wendy R. Boswell, Timothy A. Judge, & Robert D. Bretz
Jr., Personality and Cognitive Ability as Predictors of Job Search Among Employed Managers, 54
PERSONNEL PSYCHOLOGY 25, 44–45 (2001) (discussing the relationship between cognitive ability, pay,
and search intensity in the job search process); FRANKLIN P. KILPATRICK, MILTON C. CUMMINGS, &
M. KENT JENNINGS, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, THE IMAGE OF THE FEDERAL SERVICE 23–24
(1964) (finding that income remains one of the most important factors during the job-making decision);
Kevin M. Murphy, Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, The Allocation of Talent: Implications for
Growth (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 3530, 1990) (observing that a large
income disparity may provide a strong incentive to gain employment in the higher paying occupation).
40. See generally Steven L. Green, Rational Choice Theory: An Overview (May 2002)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://business.baylor.edu/steve_green/green1.doc. (providing an
overview of rational-choice theory for non-specialists).
41. Id. at 4–5. Net benefits mean benefits net of costs.
42. See id. (noting RTC analysis is premised upon the assumption that individuals choose the
preferred alternative).
43. See, e.g., Phil Hodkinson & Andrew C. Sparkes, Careership: A Sociological Theory of Career
Decision Making, 18 BRIT J. SOC. EDUC. 29, 33–36 (1997).
44. See, e.g., Don Bellante & Albert N. Link, Are Public Sector Workers More Risk Averse than
Private Sector Workers?, 34 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 408, 408 (1981) (showing that individuals with a
high level of risk aversion are more likely to seek employment in the public sector, implying that a
policy of intersectoral equality of pay for comparable jobs would result in an excess supply of workers
to the public sector).
45. See, e.g., Hal G. Rainey, Reward Preferences Among Public and Private Managers: In Search of
the Service Ethic, 16 AM. REV. PUB. ADMIN. 288, passim (1982).
46. See, e.g., Scott C. Douglas & Mark J. Martinko, Exploring the Role of Individual Differences in
the Prediction of Workplace Aggression, 86 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 547, 547–59 (2001).
47. Cf. Melissa Wong, Elliroma Gardiner, Whitney Lang, & Leah Coulon, Generational
Differences in Personality and Motivation: Do they Exist and What are the Implications for the
Workplace?, 23 J. MANAGERIAL PSYCHOL. 878, 878 (2008) (noting no personality differences between
baby boomers, those of “Generation Y,” and those of “Generation X”).
48. James L. Perry & Lois R. Wise, The Motivational Bases of Public Service, 50 PUB. ADMIN.
REV. 367, 368 (1990).
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49

public sector in order to work for the public good.
Proponents of PSM argue that “effective and well-functioning public
organizations are populated by individuals with a sense of PSM, that this sense
actively motivates employees in their work, and, implicitly, that such
50
considerations do not motivate employees of private firms.” Thus, public51
sector employees can be motivated by factors other than income, whereas
private-sector employees place a higher value on economic rewards than public52
sector employees.
The reliability of PSM is not, however, free from doubt. Although some
studies find that highly educated and more experienced workers are far more
likely to choose the public sector, offsetting lower wages with rewards arising
53
from the characteristics of their jobs, other studies find no differences in the
54
relative value of money between public-sector and private-sector employees
and find that compensation is a decisive factor even for workers with high
55
PSM. One study even finds that public-sector employees value compensation
49. Hal G. Rainey & Paula Steinbauer, Galloping Elephants: Developing Elements of a Theory of
Effective Government Organizations, 20 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 1, 23 (1999) (referring to a
“general altruistic motivation to serve the interests of a community of people, a state, a nation or
humankind”). Other motivations contrast with PSM, such as psychopathic personalities being drawn to
and thriving in turbulent workplaces, such as investment banks. Clive R. Boddy, The Implications of
Corporate Psychopaths for Business and Society: An Initial Examination and a Call to Arms, 1
AUSTRALASIAN J. OF BUS. & BEHAV. SCI. 30, 30–40 (2005) (“Corporate Psychopaths are simply the
roughly 1% of the population who are certifiably psychopathic and who work in corporations and other
business organisations. Unlike the criminal psychopaths of popular imagination these people are not
identifiably insane or suffering from mental delusions but are just ruthless, corporate careerists.”).
Research has predicted that the incidence of “corporate psychopaths” may be as high as four percent
on Wall Street. Paul Babiak, Craig S. Neumann, & Robert D. Hare, Corporate Psychopathy: Taking the
Walk, BEHAV. SCI. & LAW 174, 183 (2010) (cautioning that this number was extrapolated from a small
sample and may not be representative of the private financial sector).
50. See Patrick Francois, ‘Public Service Motivation’ as an Argument for Government Provision, 78
J. PUB. ECON., 275, 276 (2000).
51. See Sue A. Frank & Gregory B. Lewis, Government Employees Working Hard or Hardly
Working?, 34 AM. REV. PUB. ADMIN. 36, 36–51 (2004); cf. Josse Delfgaauw & Robert Dur, Managerial
Talent, Motivation, and Self-Selection into Public Management, 94 J. PUB. ECON. 654, 655 (2010)
(arguing that individuals will choose the sector that offers them the highest overall return on ability and
that income is only a minor part of that return).
52. See, e.g., Ron Cacioppe & Philip Mock, A Comparison of the Quality of Work Experience in
Government and Private Organizations, 37 HUM. REL. 923, 923 (1984); Hal G. Rainey, Reward
Preferences Among Public and Private Managers: In Search of the Service Ethic, 15 ADMIN. & SOC’Y
207, 210–13 (1982); James R. Rawls, Robert Ullrich, & Oscar T. Nelson, A Comparison of Managers
Entering or Reentering the Profit and Nonprofit Sectors, 18 ACAD. MGMT. J. 616, 618 (1976) (finding
managers in the private sector valuing prosperity over helpfulness); Jay R. Schuster, Jerome A. Colletti,
& L. Knowles, The Relationship Between Perceptions Concerning Magnitudes of Pay and Perceived
Utility of Pay: Public and Private Organizations Compared, 9 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. PERFORMANCE
110, 112–118 (1973) (contrasting perceptions about pay between public and private sector employees).
53. Rebecca M. Blank, An Analysis of Workers’ Choice between Employment in the Public and
Private Sectors, 38 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 211, 211, 219 (1985).
54. Gerald T. Gabris & Gloria Simo, Public Sector Motivation as an Independent Variable
Affecting Career Decisions, 24 PUB. PERSONNEL MGMT. 33, 33 (1995).
55. Dennis Wittmer, Serving the People or Serving for Pay: Reward Preferences Among
Government, Hybrid Sector, and Business Managers, 14 PUB. PRODUCTIVITY & MGMT. REV. 369, 378–
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56

more highly than private-sector employees. Still another study finds that
individuals who value income would rather work for the public sector but are
57
more likely to be employed in the private sector.
Even the notion that happiness is a dominant factor when reaching an
employment decision is questionable. Recent research shows that individuals
would rather pursue a higher-paying job making more demands on their time
58
than a lower-paying job making only reasonable demands on their time. None
of these studies suggests, even implictly, that PSM should be sufficient to
overcome the two-to-one income disparity between financial regulators and
59
members of the financial industry.
Moreover, even if PSM were, arguendo, otherwise generally sufficient to
overcome that large disparity, the robustness of PSM is questionable in the
context of persons interested in finance. Most studies on PSM generalize all
public-sector workers, including so-called “parapublic” jobs in education and
60
healthcare. However, because the PSM of parapublic-sector employees is
61
considerably higher than that of employees in other public-sector jobs, those
studies skew the PSM of public-sector workers outside of education and
healthcare—and thus of public-sector workers in finance—to appear higher
than it actually is.
For persons interested in finance, the robustness of PSM is also questionable
because those persons, by reason of that very interest, would be expected to
inherently favor higher financial incomes. Some financial employees are, by

80 (1991). Cf. U.S. MERIT SYS. PROT. BD., ATTRACTING THE NEXT GENERATION: A LOOK AT
FEDERAL ENTRY-LEVEL NEW HIRES 33 (2008), available at http://www.mspb.gov/netsearch/
viewdocs.aspx?docnumber=314895&version=315306&application=ACROBAT (finding that yearly pay
increases are the most important factor attracting new workers to federal government jobs).
56. Ebrahim A. Maidani, Comparative Study of Herzberg’s Two-Factor Theory of Job Satisfaction
Among Public and Private Sectors, 20 PUB. PERSONNEL MGMT. 441, 441 (1991).
57. Lewis & Frank, supra note 6, at 398.
58. George Lowery, When Opting for Happiness or Income, Many Go for the Cash, CORNELL
CHRON. (Sept. 16, 2011), http://news.cornell.edu/stories/2011/09/study-finds-we-choose-money-overhappiness.
59. Further, most research on PSM focuses only on its existence and not on actual job decisions.
Robert Christensen & Bradley E. Wright, The Effects of Public Service Motivation on Job Choice
Decisions: Disentangling the Contributions of Person-Organization Fit and Person-Job Fit, 21 J. PUB.
ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 723, 724 (2011). When assessing the impact of PSM on job decisions, it is
important to distinguish between public-sector preference and realistic public-sector choices. See Trui
Steen, Not a Government Monopoly: The Private, Nonprofit, and Voluntary Sectors, in MOTIVATION IN
PUBLIC MANAGEMENT 203, 204 (James L. Perry & Annie Hondeghem eds., 2008) (observing that
pursuing public-sector work involves not only the choice but also the opportunity to do so).
60. E.g., Lewis & Frank, supra note 6, at 400; James L. Perry, Antecedents of Public Service
Motivation, 7 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 181, 190–93 (1997); Steen, supra note 59, at 204.
61. Sean T. Lyons, Linda E. Duxbury, & Christopher A. Higgins, A Comparison of the Values and
Commitment of Private Sector, Public Sector, and Parapublic Sector Employees, 66 PUB. ADMIN. REV.
605, 613 (2006); see Christensen & Wright, supra note 59, at 724 (finding that high-PSM individuals may
find public-sector jobs stressing welfare, education, and culture to be more attractive than other publicsector jobs).
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62

their very nature, materialistic. Many others are taught to “focus on profit and
the acquisition of wealth” by the very schools in which they receive their
63
financial education. Moreover, persons interested in finance may be attracted
to the more innovative opportunities available in the financial industry to create
financial products, in contrast to financial regulatory jobs in which they would
primarily monitor the industry. Whatever the reason, empirical evidence
indicates that the most well-trained financial employees self-select into higher64
paying positions.
B. The Difficulty of Regulatory Agencies To Hire Creates an Information
Asymmetry
The difficulty of regulatory agencies to hire competitively compared to the
financial industry creates an information asymmetry between financial
regulators and members of the financial industry. As shown below, the two-toone income disparity drives a significant difference in employee intellect and
abilities. Those attributes are critical to understanding complex financial
products and markets.
Although the general problem of asymmetric information has been debated
65
at length by scholars, this article’s focus—on information asymmetry resulting
from differences in intellect and abilities between regulators and the
regulated—is new. Scholars studying information asymmetries between
regulators and the regulated have focused in the past almost exclusively on
66
information acquisition and product-development lag time. Thus, when
regulators acquire industry information, they do so “only with a lag, and indeed,
in a rapidly changing environment, the information that they acquire may be of
67
only limited relevance to the current situation.”
62. Cf. Daniel M. Cable & Timothy A. Judge, Pay Preferences and Job Search Decisions: A
Person-Organization Fit Perspective, 47 PERSONNEL PSYCHOL. 317, 340–41 (1994) (observing that
materialistic job seekers “placed greater emphasis on pay level”).
63. Robert A. Giacalone & Donald T. Wargo, The Roots of the Global Financial Crisis Are in Our
Business Schools, 6 J. BUS. ETHICS EDUC. 147, 158 (2009) (examining the impact of business schools on
the value systems of their students).
64. See Kuhnen, supra note 34, at 2.
65. See, e.g., Glenn Blackmon & Richard Zeckhauser, Fragile Commitments and the Regulatory
Process, 9 YALE J. REG. 73, 104 (1992) (noting “the principal-agent relationship between the regulator
and firm” and the firm’s “advantage of superior information”); Paul L. Joskow & Richard
Schmalensee, Incentive Regulation for Electric Utilities, 4 YALE J. REG. 1, 18 (1986) (noting that “the
regulator’s information is assumed to be inferior to that of the utility’s management” and that “the
assumption of asymmetric information is quite plausible”).
66. E.g., STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 109 (1982) (arguing that “[t]he
central problem of the standard-setting process and the most pressing task facing many agencies is
gathering the information needed to write a sensible standard.”); Cary Coglianese, Richard
Zeckhauser, & Edward Parson, Seeking Truth for Power: Informational Strategy and Regulatory
Policymaking, 89 MINN. L. REV. 277, 280–81 (2004); Henry T.C. Hu, Misunderstood Derivatives: The
Causes of Informational Failure and the Promise of Regulatory Incrementalism, 102 YALE L.J. 1457,
1499 (1993) (arguing that regulators cannot keep up with the development of complex derivatives
products because of the time lag).
67. David E.M. Sappington & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Information and Regulation, in PUBLIC
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That focus is limited to regulators obtaining information and the innate
advantages the financial industry gains from developing the products to be
regulated and, hence, not having to acquire information about them through
third parties. It therefore only indirectly concerns differences in intellect and
abilities; because industry first develops the products to be regulated, even the
brightest and most able regulators would be disadvantaged and subject to lag
time.
In contrast, this article’s focus on significant differences in intellect and
abilities goes to the ability of financial regulators to process the information
once obtained. In order to process that information, regulators must have
sufficient expertise to understand the financial transactions and their terms, the
legal and financial obligations of the different parties involved, and the level of
68
risk taken on by the regulated firms.
There are at least three levels of complexity in financial markets: (1)
complexities of the assets underlying investment securities traded in financial
markets and of the means of originating those assets; (2) complexities of those
investment securities themselves; and (3) complexities of those financial
69
markets, which operate as systems. Understanding these levels of complexity
70
sometimes challenges experts at even the most sophisticated financial firms.
Administrative agencies that lack that expertise are even more challenged to
71
understand these levels of complexity.

REGULATION 3, 6 (Elizabeth E. Bailey ed., 1987). See also Edward J. Kane, Hair of the Dog that Bit
Us: The Insufficiency of New and Improved Capital Requirements 6 (Aug. 11, 2014) (unpublished
manuscript),
available
at
https://www2.bc.edu/edward-kane/
HAIR%20OF%20THE%20DOG%20THAT%20BIT%20US.pdf (observing that “[i]n the metagame
of controlling regulation-induced risk-taking, regulators are outcoached, outgunned, and always playing
from behind”).
68. Eric J. Pan, Understanding Financial Regulation, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 1897, 1934, 1934 n.167
(2012); See also id. at 1934 (observing that “[h]iring and retaining knowledgeable and experienced
personnel is a key component of a regulator’s efforts to manage the flow of information to the extent
skilled personnel permits regulators to develop independent capacity to evaluate and analyze
developments in the financial markets”).
69. Schwarcz, supra note 1, at 216–36.
70. Cf. Steven L. Schwarcz, Disclosure’s Failure in the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 2008 UTAH L.
REV. 1109, 1113–15 (2008) (arguing that although the disclosure documents describing complex assetbacked securities generally complied with federal securities law, investors did not fully understand
those securities or their risks); Schwarcz, supra note 1, at 243 (observing that even the most
sophisticated investors lost money in the recent financial crisis).
71. Cf. THE BOSTON CONSULTING GROUP, U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION:
ORGANIZATIONAL STUDY AND REFORM 53–54 (Mar. 10, 2011), available at 2011 WL 830339
(observing that the SEC’s senior management considers the SEC’s staff analytical capabilities to be
only average or even below, and attributing that to the SEC’s relatively flat budget and its resulting
hiring difficulties); Howell E. Jackson, Variation in the Intensity of Financial Regulation: Preliminary
Evidence and Potential Implications, 24 YALE J. REG. 253, 273 (2007) (finding that the regulatory
budget per staff member indicates the staff quality).
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III
REGULATORY CONSEQUENCES OF THE INFORMATION ASYMMETRY
Only two scholars have previously studied this type of information
asymmetry between financial regulators and industry. Their views on its
consequences have been dramatic though cursory:
Following the crises of 1930 through 1933 and 2007 through 2008, regulators have
been blamed for lax oversight. In retrospect, it is clear that regulators did not have the
human capital to keep up with the financial industry, and to understand it well enough
to be able to exert effective regulation. Given the wage premia that we document, it
was impossible for regulators to attract and retain highly skilled financial workers,
72
because [regulatory agencies] could not compete with private-sector wages.

Any explanation of consequences, however, should be more nuanced
because financial regulation by administrative agencies is not merely one73
dimensional but encompasses rulemaking, monitoring, and enforcement. To
understand the consequences of the information asymmetry, consider how that
asymmetry could impact administrative-agency rulemaking, monitoring, and
enforcement.
A. Consequences to Rulemaking
In the context of financial regulation, it has been argued that “[w]here the
budgets are stronger and the staffing deeper, the agency can write more
74
nuanced, tailored rules.” The logic of that argument appears to be that the
regulatory agency thereby has a sufficient number of “trained people” to apply
75
the rules. That argument, however, can also be supported by observing that
the better regulators understand financial innovations, the better they can
76
promulgate rules to curb harmful innovations. Absent a clear understanding,

72. Thomas Philippon & Ariell Reshef, Wages and Human Capital in the U.S. Financial Industry:
1909–2006, at 31 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No. 14644, 2009) (citations omitted).
Philippon and Reshef thus argue that the income disparity “provides an explanation for regulatory
failures.” Id. Other scholars have not studied but merely alluded to an information asymmetry between
financial regulators and industry due to intellect. See, e.g., Bond & Glode, supra note 32, at 2540
(observing a criticism that, “bluntly put, financial regulators are not as smart as the bankers and traders
they are charged with overseeing.”).
73. Professor Eric Pan divides what I call “monitoring” into two functions: “supervision” and
“certification.” Pan, supra note 68, at 1909. He defines “supervision” as a regulator’s “monitoring,
assessment, and guidance of an entity’s efforts to meet its regulatory obligations.” Id. at 1911. He
defines “certification” as “the substantive evaluation and approval of products or services by the
regulator,” such as licensing and registration. Id. at 1914. My term “monitoring” includes these
functions other than approval of financial products or services. Financial regulation in the United States
does not currently enable regulators to approve or disapprove financial products per se, other than by
issuing administrative rules or regulations governing those products—which would be included in the
category of rulemaking.
74. Howell E. Jackson & Mark J. Roe, Public and Private Enforcement of Securities Laws:
Resource-Based Evidence, 93 J. FIN. ECON. 207, 235 (2009).
75. Id.
76. Cf. id. (observing that “a higher budget and more staffing facilitate the regulatory agency
being able to write, revise, and enforce better, more sophisticated rules”).
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regulators might not only fail to promulgate adequate rules; they also might
77
misinterpret the innovations and promulgate rules that are harmful.
The tendency to promulgate harmful rules might be heightened if regulators
lack good judgment. In that context, it might be interesting to explore whether
the income disparity creates another type of “information” asymmetry: one in
which some regulators have good technical intellect but lack good judgment. In
my experience, the financial industry strives to hire, and pays dearly for,
employees who have both good technical intellect and good judgment.
Administrative agencies might well seek to hire at least some employees with
good technical intellect; but the pool of those employees who also have good
judgment and are willing to work for low government pay will be small. That
might help to explain why many of the bright financial regulators I have met
tend to be very narrow and rigid, seeing problems in black and white and often
lacking the flexibility to try to see others’ perspectives.
B. Consequences to Monitoring
As explained, this information asymmetry can prevent regulators from fully
78
understanding financial innovations and products. Absent that understanding,
they might fail to promulgate adequate rules and might even promulgate
79
harmful rules. That absence may also have monitoring consequences—that
regulators will be unable to effectively monitor financial innovations and
products. Professor Pan, for example, argues that with additional resources
administrative agencies can “hire better skilled and more experienced
personnel” who can “review more carefully new [financial] products and
80
services . . . .”
That is not to say that reducing the income disparity between regulators and
industry could eliminate information-based market failures. Not only regulators
but also industry participants—including rating agencies, monoline insurance
companies, and even the most sophisticated and largest institutional investors—
either missed or did not adequately take into account early warning signs of the
81
recent financial crisis. Moreover, human nature might lead some regulators to
overrely on information provided by financial firms that offer, or at least

77. Cf. Hu, supra note 66, at 1508 (arguing that regulators who succeed in gaining current industry
information on financial innovation may not be sophisticated enough to interpret and thus may
misinterpret that information).
78. See supra notes 69–77 and accompanying text.
79. See supra text accompanying note 77.
80. Pan, supra note 68, at 1932. He also observes that additional resources would enable financial
regulators to “invest in more sophisticated information processing and surveillance systems . . . .” Id.
81. See Schwarcz, supra note 1, at 243. In many cases, moreover, information failures were caused
not by information asymmetry but by mutual misinformation: by retaining residual risk portions of
certain complex securitization products they were selling, underwriters may actually have fostered false
investor confidence, contributing to the recent financial crisis. See id. at 241–42 (discussing mutual
misinformation).
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purport to offer, transparency, and with which the regulators have developed
longstanding relationships. Nonetheless, reducing the income disparity should
at least help to reduce the information asymmetry and its consequences.
C. Consequences to Enforcement
Because of the sheer number of regulatory personnel needed to pursue
enforcement actions, enforcement—more than rulemaking and monitoring—
turns as much on the quantity as on the quality of regulators. Professor Pan, for
example, argues that additional resources will also enable administrative
82
agencies to hire personnel who can “pursue more enforcement actions.”
Professors Jackson and Roe similarly argue that “more resources [in the form
of “high budgets and staffing”] facilitate regulatory investigations, [thereby]
83
making it easier for [an] agency to bring enforcement actions . . . .”
Nonetheless, “much public enforcement is done informally” by regulators,
84
such as through “a regulator’s raised eyebrow.” “[I]nformal public
85
enforcement” of this type “requires highly skilled staffers.” Furthermore,
greater regulatory expertise should enable administrators to better enforce
86
highly sophisticated rules and regulations.
In summary, the two-to-one income disparity between the financial industry
and its regulators creates an information asymmetry that can cause regulatory
failures in rulemaking, monitoring, and enforcement. That helps to explain why
financial regulation is so often inadequate. Next consider how the information
asymmetry could be mitigated.
IV
ADDRESSING THE INFORMATION ASYMMETRY
The information asymmetry could be addressed directly by reducing the
information disparity. It also could be addressed indirectly. First, consider the
direct approach.
A. Reducing The Income Disparity
The information asymmetry that results from the income disparity between
regulators and the financial industry could be mitigated most directly by
reducing this disparity. That could be done in at least two ways: by increasing
regulators’ compensation, and by limiting financial-industry compensation.

82. Pan, supra note 68, at 1932.
83. Jackson & Roe, supra note 74, at 235.
84. Id. (referring to this type of informal enforcement in England and to informal “administrative
guidance” in Japan).
85. Id.
86. Cf. id. (observing that a “higher budget and more staffing” should “facilitate the regulatory
agency being able to . . . enforce . . . more sophisticated rules”).
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1. Increasing Regulators’ Compensation
In an ideal universe, the income disparity would be addressed directly by
increasing regulators’ compensation. The ability of government to do this is, of
course, highly subject to political considerations. In the United States, that
would depend not only on increasing the budgets of financial regulatory
agencies but also on further exempting employees of those agencies from the
87
general schedule and other applicable per-person-pay limitations.
Some scholars argue that attracting more able workers into the public sector
(whether through increasing income or otherwise) would be inefficient,
88
suggesting that the return on talent is higher in the private sector. That may or
may not generally be true, but it is unlikely to be true for financial regulation so
long as regulators suffer from an information asymmetry that can prevent them
from effectively monitoring and regulating financial innovations that might
create systemic externalities.
It therefore ought to be efficient to increase regulators’ compensation as
needed to reduce that information asymmetry. That raises the question, though,
of what level of increase is needed. Although not a controlled experiment, the
experience of Singapore may be instructive. Singapore pays its government
89
regulators incomes that match or exceed those of comparable private-sector
90
workers. Its officials have publicly stated that pay should not be a reason not
91
to join, or to leave, a Singaporean regulatory agency. Thus, the salaries for
employees of the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS), the principal
Singaporean supervisor and regulator of the financial industry, is pegged to
92
financial-industry salaries. This appears to be done by reviewing the top
salaries of a range of financial professionals and by calculating an average

87. Cf. supra notes 7–9 and accompanying text.
88. Cf. Francesca Barigozzi, Nadia Burani & Davide Raggi, The Lemons Problem in a Labor
Market with Intrinsic Motivation: When Higher Salaries Pay Worse Workers, (Quaderni DSE Working
Paper No. 883, 2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2271987 (arguing
that when workers are motivated, inefficiencies due to adverse selection are mitigated).
89. Some suggest this pay parity applies not to all Singaporean government regulators but just to
ministers and high level officers. Sajid Anwar & Choon Yin Sam, Private Sector Corporate Governance
and the Singaporean Government-Linked Corporations, 7 INT’L PUB. MGMT. REV. 66, 80 (2006) (citing
Vito Tanzi, Corruption Around the World: Causes, Consequences, Scope, and Cures 573 (IMF Working
Paper No. WP/98/63, 1998)).
90. Doha Abdelhamid & Laila El Baradei, Reforming the Pay System for Government Employees
in Egypt 26 (Working Paper No. 151, 2009). In the final published version of this paper, however, the
part on Singapore was omitted. See Doha Abdelhamid & Laila El Baradei, Reforming the Pay System
for Government Employees in Egypt, 11 INT’L PUB. MGMT. REV., no. 3, 2010, available at
http://www1.imp.unisg.ch/org/idt/ipmr.nsf/.
91. See Seth Mydans, Singapore Announces 60 Percent Pay Raise for Ministers, N.Y. TIMES, April
9, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/09/world/asia/09iht-sing.3.5200498.html?_r=0 (quoting
Defense Minister Teo Chee Hean).
92. MONETARY & CAPITAL MKTS. DEP’T, INT’L MONETARY FUND, SINGAPORE: DETAILED
ASSESSMENT OF IMPLEMENTATION—IOSCO OBJECTIVES AND PRINCIPLES OF SECURITIES
REGULATION 48–49 (Dec. 2013), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2013/cr13344.pdf.
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93

income to be applied to financial regulators.
The International Monetary Fund believes that the resulting high salaries
have enabled MAS not only to attract and retain regulatory staff with excellent
94
qualifications and expertise but also to achieve a high degree of compliance
with the principles of the International Organization of Securities Commissions
95
(IOSCO). The resulting effectiveness of Singapore’s regulatory system is
96
believed to have helped establish Singapore as a regional financial center.
Singapore thus appears to be a successful example of directly addressing the
income disparity, and resulting information asymmetry, by increasing
regulators’ compensation. But whether the Singaporean attempt at income
parity could be viable in other countries, including the United States, is unclear.
Even given the political will to achieve that parity, the financial industry would
be motivated and—so long as finance is highly profitable—able to match and
exceed any public-sector raises that would aim to draw away significant talent.
Singapore’s success to the contrary may be bound up with a regulatory
economy-of-scale or another country-specific explanation. That would help to
explain the puzzling evidence suggesting that, notwithstanding Singapore’s
income parity between financial regulators and industry, its per-person
97
regulatory costs are still slightly lower than those of the United States.
Finally, a variant on increasing regulators’ compensation would be to pay
regulators based on their performance. Professors Henderson and Tung, for
example, partly blame the lack of incentive, which performance-based pay
could help create, for the failure of bank examiners to act aggressively to
98
prevent excessive risk during the recent financial crisis. They argue that
compensating bank examiners based on performance would help to reduce
99
future bank failures.
Performance-based pay for regulators is an interesting idea, but whether it
would work in practice is yet to be seen—although one could view bonuses paid
100
to regulators as a form of performance-based pay. Henderson and Tung agree

93.
94.
95.
96.

Abdelhamid & Baradei, supra note 90, at 26.
MONETARY & CAPITAL MKTS. DEP’T, INT’L MONETARY FUND, supra note 92, at 48.
See id. at 5.
Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Role of the State in Financial Markets, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE
WORLD BANK ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS 1993: SUPPLEMENT TO THE
WORLD BANK ECONOMIC REVIEW AND THE WORLD BANK RESEARCH OBSERVER 19, 36 (1993).
97. See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 71, at 291 (finding no material difference between the per-person
costs of U.S. and Singaporean financial regulators, where the per-person cost of financial regulators
was, at the time of his research, $146,515 in Singapore, $154,840 in the United States, and $175,644 in
Ireland).
98. See M. Todd Henderson & Frederick Tung, Pay for Regulator Performance, 85 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1003, 1003 (2012).
99. Id. (arguing that the performance-based pay should be a “debt-heavy mix of phantom bank
debt and equity, as well as a separate bonus linked to the timing of the decision to take over a bank”).
100. See supra note 25 and accompanying text (observing that administrative agencies pay, albeit
rarely, limited bonuses to regulators). See also Henderson & Tung, supra note 98, at 1013 (observing
that “[b]ank regulatory agencies have begun using bonuses ostensibly tied to performance”).
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that the “key” to this method’s success would be “finding metrics for measuring
‘good’ and ‘bad’ performance in government, and deploying them in ways that
101
will not make things worse.” They argue that this method should be feasible,
102
at least for compensating bank examiners. Even if they are correct, however,
the rapid rise of disintermediation and shadow banking—in which nonbanking
firms and financial markets increasingly replace banks as the source of financial
103
intermediation —is diminishing the importance of the bank examiner’s job in
104
the overall task of financial regulation.
2. Limiting Financial Industry Compensation
A further way to mitigate the income disparity and, hence, the information
asymmetry might be to legally limit compensation in the financial industry. A
populist movement towards limiting financial-industry compensation has gained
momentum in recent years, as a reaction (among other things) to the huge
bonuses paid to senior financial executives while shareholders of their firms
105
faced losses.
Limiting financial industry compensation might, however, have unintended
consequences: “Experience has [] found that direct government control of pay
106
creates a host of perverse and unintended consequences.” Furthermore, at
least in the United States, there is a strong historical bias in favor of free
markets and against government restriction of private-sector compensation.
And even if there otherwise is political will to impose such restrictions, it might
107
not extend to restrictions beyond the highest-paid executives; and those
executives are not the ones for whom the income disparity creates the most
108
troublesome information asymmetry.

101. Henderson & Tung, supra note 98, at 1010.
102. Id.
103. See generally Steven L. Schwarcz, The Governance Structure of Shadow Banking: Rethinking
Assumptions About Limited Liability, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1 (2014) (arguing that shadow
banking’s transformation of the financial industry calls for redesigning limited liability in the corporate
governance context).
104. In 2011, the size of the shadow-banking system was estimated at $67 trillion worldwide. FIN.
STABILITY BD., GLOBAL SHADOW BANKING MONITORING REPORT 3 (2012); cf. ZOLTAN POZSAR ET
AL., FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK STAFF REPORTS, NO. 458: SHADOW BANKING 4–5
(2010) (arguing that shadow bank financing appears to dwarf traditional bank financing).
105. See, e.g., Louise Story & Eric Dash, Bankers Reaped Lavish Bonuses During Bailouts, N.Y.
TIMES, July 31, 2009, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/31/business/31pay.html
(discussing criticism aimed at banker’s compensation).
106. Martin Wolf, Why and How Should We Regulate Pay in the Financial Sector?, in THE FUTURE
OF FINANCE AND THE THEORY THAT UNDERPINS IT 235, 238 (2010), available at
http://harr123et.files.wordpress.com/2010/07/futureoffinance-chapter91.pdf.
107. Cf. supra note 105 and accompanying text (observing that the populist backlash concerns huge
bonuses paid to senior financial executives).
108. Cf. Steven L. Schwarcz, Conflicts and Financial Collapse: The Problem of SecondaryManagement Agency Costs, 26 YALE J. REG. 457, 458–59 (2009) (observing that secondary managers
structure, sell, and invest in financial market securities on behalf of their firms).
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B. Other Measures
One could also consider other measures that do not address the income
disparity per se but that nonetheless might help reduce the information
asymmetry or its consequences. These measures could include increasing the
nonmonetary attraction of public-sector regulatory jobs, reducing the
information asymmetry by blunt force, and accepting the information
asymmetry and regulating to mitigate its consequences.
1. Increasing the Nonmonetary Attraction of Public-Sector Regulatory Jobs
The nonmonetary attraction of public-sector regulatory jobs could be
increased, at least in theory, by making those jobs more challenging and by
109
increasing regulatory prestige. Although “pay can be an important factor in
determining person-job fit as individuals have financial needs that they expect
their jobs to help satisfy,” individuals “often have to make [employment]
decisions that require weighing trade-offs between financial rewards and other
110
desired job characteristics.”
To some extent, the European training of judges might provide a model for
increasing regulatory prestige. In continental Europe, “the tendency is to
appoint young, easily trainable law graduates willing to accept a prestigious and
stable career, if not one as well paid as that of a highly successful attorney or
111
consultant.” French judges, for example, are recruited nationally through
competitive examinations to attend the National School for the Judiciary
112
(ENM), which prepares them for a lifetime civil-service career.
2. Reducing the Information Asymmetry by Blunt Force
There are several ways that the information asymmetry could be reduced by
blunt force, including by standardizing financial products, by increasing
specialization among regulators, and by paying third-party experts to try to
reduce the asymmetry. The Dodd–Frank Act effectively utilizes the first
approach, for example, by requiring many derivatives transactions to be cleared
113
through clearinghouses,
which generally require a high degree of
114
standardization in the derivatives that they clear.
But standardization can backfire. Dodd–Frank’s clearinghouse requirement

109. Cf. Gabris & Simo, supra note 54, at 49 (arguing that if public-sector regulatory jobs were
made more challenging and monetarily appealing, they would draw good recruits). The italicized
language undercuts their argument as applied to this article, however.
110. Christensen & Wright, supra note 59, at 728.
111. Luis Muniz-Arguelles & Migdalia Fraticelli-Torres, Selection and Training of Judges in Spain,
France, West Germany, and England, 8 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 2 (1985).
112. Id. at 5 n.14, 11.
113. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203 §
723(a)(3) (2010).
114. This can become a little circular, though, because Dodd–Frank includes an exception for
derivatives that a clearinghouse will not accept for clearing. See id. (requiring clearing through a
clearinghouse “if the swap is required to be cleared”).
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might inadvertently increase systemic risk by concentrating derivatives
115
exposure at the clearinghouse level. And the overall economic impact of
standardization is unclear because “standardization can stifle innovation and
interfere with the ability of parties to achieve the efficiencies that arise when
firms craft financial products tailored to the particular needs and risk
116
preferences of investors.”
An approach similar to standardization would be to regulate financial
innovation so heavily that industry would not benefit from having more
qualified workers and thus would pay them less. Research has found “a very
117
tight link between deregulation and human capital in the financial sector.”
Thus, “regulation inhibits the ability to exploit the creativity and innovation of
educated and skilled workers” in the financial industry, whereas deregulation
“unleashes creativity and innovation and increases demand” for those
118
workers. This approach would therefore also be risky because discouraging
innovation and creativity could have myriad adverse and unanticipated
consequences.
Another possible way to try to reduce the information asymmetry would be
to increase regulatory specialization. Specialization might lead to adverse
consequences, however, potentially making the regulators’ focus so narrow that,
over time, they will miss the dynamically changing bigger picture; or making
regulators’ jobs less interesting, thereby further increasing the information
asymmetry by discouraging workers to apply for regulatory positions.
The limited experience with regulatory specialization has shown mixed
results, as exemplified by the World Bank’s Financial Sector Assessment
Program (FSAP). In 1995, the World Bank formed a team of financial
119
specialists to try to better diagnose problems within financial systems. At the
outset, the team was able to synergistically capitalize on the knowledge added
120
by each individual specialist. Over time, however, the specialists focused
121
increasingly on their specific subdisciplines.
Yet another approach would be to pay third-party experts to try to reduce
the information asymmetry. But the widely publicized failure of credit-rating
agencies to accurately rate mortgage-backed securities, and concerns that such

115. See Iman Anabtawi & Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Systemic Risk: Towards an Analytical
Framework, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1349, 1395 (2011) (observing that “central clearing merely shifts
counterparty risk to a clearinghouse, reducing that risk only to the extent that clearinghouses can
manage risk better or are more creditworthy than individual firms”).
116. Steven L. Schwarcz, Controlling Financial Chaos: The Power and Limits of Law, 2012 WIS. L.
REV. 815, 820 (2012).
117. Philippon & Reshef, supra note 72, at 4.
118. Id.
119. Gerard Caprio, Jr., Financial Regulation in a Changing World: Lessons from the Recent Crisis 6
(The Inst. for Int’l Integration Studies, Discussion Paper No. 308, 2009), available at
https://www.tcd.ie/iiis/documents/discussion/pdfs/iiisdp308.pdf.
120. Id.
121. Id.
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failure was a causal factor in the financial crisis, raise questions as to the
122
efficacy—or at least of the political acceptability—of this type of approach.
3. Accepting the Information Asymmetry and Regulating To Mitigate its
Consequences
Finally, another possible response would be to accept the reality of the
income disparity, and hence the resulting information asymmetry, and to
regulate in a way that mitigates its consequences. The main consequence of the
information asymmetry is that financial regulation will be insufficient to prevent
all financial failures. Professor Anabtawi and I have argued that ex ante
(preventative) financial regulation is, for various reasons, inherently insufficient
123
to prevent all financial failures, and thus financial failures are inevitable.
Therefore, any financial regulatory strategy should also include ex post
124
(ameliorative) regulation.
Such regulation could include, for example,
government-imposed financial safety nets and mechanisms to disrupt the
125
transmission of systemic failure. That same strategy should help to address
financial failures that result from the information asymmetry.
V
CONCLUSIONS
The extraordinary income disparity between financial regulators and their
industry counterparts differentiates financial regulation from other forms of
regulation. At each level, financial-industry employees make at least twice as
much as financial regulators (in contrast to nonfinancial industry employees,
who make on average only twenty-five percent more than their regulatory
126
counterparts). This huge income disparity undermines the ability of financial
regulatory agencies to hire competitively, in turn driving a significant difference
in employee intellect and abilities.
These attributes are especially critical, however, in order to understand
increasingly complex financial products and markets. The resulting information
asymmetry between financial regulators and industry can lead to regulatory

122. See, e.g., Sophia Grene, Big Three Credit Rating Agencies Under Fire, FINANCIAL TIMES, May
4, 2014, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/4140e388-cfc1-11e3-9b2b-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3K23McdO2
(discussing the perceived culpability of credit-rating agencies in the recent financial crisis).
123. Iman Anabtawi & Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Ex Post: How Law Can Address the
Inevitability of Financial Failure, 92 TEX. L. REV. 75, 93–96, 130–31 (2013).
124. Id. at 130–31 (explaining why this two-pronged regulatory approach is needed).
125. Id. at 102–22.
126. This comparison is necessarily imprecise because it uses general-industry data to approximate
nonfinancial industry data. See supra note 6 and accompanying text (comparing federal government
and private-sector pay for similar jobs). Among other sources of imprecision, the general-industry data
already include, and thus the income disparity based on those data is increased by, financial-sector data.
Accordingly, the actual income disparity between nonfinancial industry employees and nonfinancial
regulatory employees is probably smaller than twenty-five percent. And that income disparity (between
nonfinancial industry employees and nonfinancial regulatory employees) may be even smaller still for
the reasons discussed above. See supra note 6.
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failures at all levels, including rulemaking, monitoring, and enforcement. These
127
failures help to explain why financial regulation is so often inadequate.
Reducing the income disparity would be a politically challenging, if not
impossible, task. Even if the government were to attempt to increase the
incomes of financial regulators to private-sector levels, the financial industry
would be motivated—and because it is highly profitable, it may well (at least
128
outside Singapore ) be able—to match and exceed any income increases that
were to draw away significant talent. Another potential response is to focus
more resources on ex post financial regulation, thereby mitigating the
consequences of financial failure. That approach recognizes that, for a range of
reasons, including the income disparity, financial failures are inevitable. There
are other potential responses to attempt to correct regulatory failures resulting
from the income disparity (and resulting information asymmetry), but they are
even more “second best.”
This article’s focus is new. Although other scholars have studied information
asymmetries between regulators and the regulated, they have focused almost
exclusively on information acquisition and product-development lag time. That
focus is limited to regulators obtaining information. In contrast, this article
focuses on the information asymmetry that results from differences in intellect
and abilities between regulators and the regulated. That focus goes not to
obtaining information; instead, it goes to the ability of financial regulators to
process the information once obtained.

127. There are of course other possible explanations of why financial regulation is so often
inadequate, including other income-related explanations. Professor White suggests, for example, that
“if high returns in the financial industry are associated with risk-taking[,] higher wages will attract more
risk-takers to the financial industry and that may make potential problems in the industry worse.” Email from Eugene N. White, Professor of Economics, Rutgers University, to the author (Feb. 9, 2014)
(on file with author). Professor Lastra and others have written of the problem of bonuses based on
short-term performance, which can motivate bankers to engage in excessively risky transactions. See,
e.g., Luis Garicano & Rosa M. Lastra, Towards a New Architecture for Financial Stability: Seven Principles,
13 J. INT’L ECON. L. 597, 618 (2010). And I have written about conflicts of interest resulting from shortterm compensation of secondary managers of financial firms. See Schwarcz, supra note 108, passim.
128. See supra text accompanying notes 97–98.

